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INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the part the concept of  sustainability plays in environmental science. More specifically, I 
will argue that the present upsurge in its use is transforming environmental science into an interdisciplinary 
field while up to now it was best characterized as multidisciplinary.
If  indeed such a transformation is taking place, I think it is a matter of  importance to recognize it for what it is. 
For one, environmental scientists, particularly in the Netherlands, have spent considerable time and effort 
discussing the question of  whether environmental science at present is multi- or interdisciplinary.[1] One could 
ignore this discussion and look upon it as a local oddity if  it weren't for the existence of  particular benefits that 
an interdisciplinary status brings in its wake. I will not discuss them in any detail but, quite obviously, some of  
them concern such matters as an improved position within academia, better access to governmental and other 
funds, more impact on societal decision making, etc. I will return to these issues in my concluding remarks. But 
quite apart from any such utilitarian concerns, there is another, equally valid reason for raising the issue of  
interdisciplinarity with respect to environmental science: Issues like this are a matter of  intrinsic philosophical 
interest; they help us understand how science develops.
To be able to distinguish between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity I will make extensive use of  ideas 
first developed by Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull, first in the late seventies. Their papers point out various 
ways in which branches of  science may become unified other than through reduction.[2] Of  course, the move 
from multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity largely is an integrative one, a step towards unification. It is for this 
reason that the analytical machinery employed by Maull and Darden is very useful for my present purposes. 
Particularly their characterization of  the notion of  a field proves to be very helpful. According to them,
A field can be specified by reference to a focal problem, a domain consisting of  "facts" related to that problem, 
explanatory goals providing expectations as to how the problem is to be solved, special methods and techniques, and 
sometimes, but not always, laws and theories (italics added),[3]
or,
... a field has: a central problem; a domain to be explained; techniques and methods (unique to it or shared with other 
fields); concepts, laws, and theories; special vocabulary; and more general assumptions and goals more or less shared 
by those scientists using the techniques in trying to solve the central problem (italics added).[4]
Fields are akin such entities as disciplines and research programs. An apt example of  a field is ecology, its focal 
problem being the question of  how it is possible for populations of  organism belonging to different species to 
jointly inhabit a particular slice of  the biosphere in roughly the numbers in which they do coexist. Explanations 
in ecology have to be phrased in terms of  relations between organisms, both of  the same and different species, 
and relations between organisms and the physical environment. Relevant ecological facts, of  course, come in 
great multitudes, but existing distribution and dispersal patterns of  species certainly belong to them. Fields are 
related to theories, but differ from them in important ways. Although each theory belongs to some single field, 
fields may feature none, one, or multiple theories. One of  the theories of  ecology is the theory that explains the 
dynamics of  predator-prey relations; another one would be the one that explains the way biomass is 
constrained at different trophic levels: the higher the level, the less the biomass. Fields, finally, possess a special 
or specific vocabulary, a set of  terms that are specific if  not unique to a particular field. With respect to ecology 
the term `trophic level' provides an example, and so do `niche', and `limiting similarity'.
What about multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary fields? Most likely, there exists no hard and fast boundary 
between them. We are probably dealing here with concepts that cannot be defined or even distinguished from 
each other through a set of  jointly sufficient and separately necessary characteristics. Hence, I will not waste 
any time in attempting to do so. Nevertheless, I feel one may confidently say that the concepts form the 
extremes of  a continuum. At the one side one finds multidisciplinary fields, characterized by the lack of  such 
things as a single focal problem, uniform explanatory goals, methods and theories specific for the entire field, 
and a single specific vocabulary. Multidisciplinary fields really are multiple but related disciplines. At the other 
extreme of  the continuum true interdisciplinarity reigns, marked by the presence of  a focal problem, uniform 
field-specific explanatory goals, methods and theories, and a specific vocabulary. Of  course, the fields that are 
part of  the multidiscipline do exhibit these characteristics unless they are themselves of  a multidisciplinary 
nature
My investigation of  the role of  the concept of  sustainability in the transition of  environmental science from 
multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity will take the following form. First I will look at environmental science as 
it has been practiced up to now. I will investigate:
i) What focal problem does it have if  any?
ii) What are its explanatory goals?
iii) Are there any special methods?
iv) Are there special theories and is there a specific vocabulary?
It will quickly become clear that environmental science as traditionally practiced follows a multidisciplinary 
approach. However, I will subsequently show that roughly at the time of  publication of  the United Nations' 
report Our Common Future in 1987, things have taken a different turn. Although from then on the solution of  
environmental problems still takes input from various disciplines, the introduction of  the notion of  
sustainability has altered environmental science altogether and transformed it into an interdisciplinary field.
TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AS A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY FIELD
Clearly, environmental science is about the solution of  environmental problems. But does traditional 
environmental science exhibit a central or focal problem in the way that for instance ecology does? There does 
not seem to be any specific problem that all environmental scientists address. Let us, by way of  initial approach 
to the issue, try to frame a definition of  what the class of  environmental problems roughly looks like. This 
definition is not an attempt prescribe once and for all what is to count as an environmental problem and what 
isn't. Rather, it is an effort to come up with some criteria that according to most would be part of  the notion of 
an environmental problem as it is commonly used.
Environmental problems
As a first criterion, any definition should restrict environmental problems to changes in the physical 
environment, that is, rule out changes in our social environment (obviously, the physical environment should 
comprise both biotic (plants, animals) and abiotic (climate, landscape, water and air quality, soil type, etc.) 
components). This may seem a relatively uncontroversial restriction, but it is nonetheless crucial. Not many 
would argue, I take it, that the hindrance caused by, say, drug dealing in some neighborhood should count as an 
environmental problem; nor would many insists that the nuisance of  having to live under a totalitarian regime 
is to be counted an environmental problem. Yet both are human interferences with our environment. The 
point that disqualifies them as environmental problems is that they are changes solely of  our social environment. 
If, on the other hand, we look at something like the depletion of  the stratospheric ozone layer, commonly seen 
as a genuine environmental problem, we are dealing with a change of  the physical environment which, 
admittedly, has consequences for our social environment. A pertinent example would be the dramatically 
altered attitude of  Australians and New Zealanders towards sun bathing. However, since it is the change in the 
physical environment that has prompted these responses, we are allowed to describe the ozone problem as an 
environmental problem. So we may provisionally conclude that:
An environmental problem is a change of  state of  the physical environment.
But the characterization is insufficiently specific. Not all changes of  the physical environment are 
environmental problems. What about natural disasters? A case in point would be the damage believed to be 
done to the ozone layer by the ashes shot into the air in the June 1991 eruption of  Mount Pinatubo in the 
Philippines.[5] Clearly, this is a change of  the physical environment, but should it count as environmental 
problem?
Consider the case of  the scientists who argue that the depletion of  the ozone layer is part of  a natural process, 
one that is not linked to the human caused release of  chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs as they are often called for 
short. Or alternatively, the case of  those who argue that the current increase in the average temperature of  the 
atmosphere is due to a natural cycle rather than to its increased carbon dioxide content. The very possibility of  
discussing these matters requires us to distinguish between the `natural' and the `human caused'. Such a 
distinction is also absolutely necessary in order to be able to adjudicate liabilities. A plant using large quantities 
of  ozone destroying CFCs can be held accountable for damaging the ozone layer. However, Mount Pinatubo 
isn't answerable to the charge of  obstructing the stratospheric ozone production, nor are the inhabitants of  the 
Philippines for that matter. So allowing natural disasters, and other non-humanly caused changes in the 
environment to count as environmental problems would require us to subsequently distinguish between natural 
and non-natural ones. In view of  these complications I believe, the categories of  human-caused problems and 
natural disasters had better be kept apart right away. This leads to the following definition:
An environmental problem is a change of  state of  the physical environment which
i) is brought about by human interference with the physical environment.
In this definition a crucial element is still lacking. According to most environmental scientists, environmental 
science carries an ineliminable normative load. Environmental problems are changes in the environment the 
consequences of  which are somehow deemed unacceptable. Thus it is not the depletion of  the ozone itself  
that one finds unacceptable but rather its effects, increased incidence of  skin cancer, crop damage, etc.[6] One 
finds these consequences unacceptable because, if  anything, we should have less skin cancer, larger harvests, 
etc. Apparently, we are invoking norms - with respect to our personal of  economic well-being - in calling a 
particular change of  the physical environment an environmental problem. Any definition of  the notion of  an 
environmental problem, therefore, should reflect this normative aspect. So we have to add a second clause to 
the effect that only those human-induced changes of  the physical environment are environmental problems 
that are considered to have (morally) unacceptable consequences. A serious problem, however, is lurking in the 
back, as an example makes clear.
Suppose a soccer ball lands in my yard kicked their by my neighbor's kids. This constitutes a particular kind of  
change of  state of  the physical environment caused by human beings and I really find it an unacceptable 
infringement of  my privacy as the ball knocks down the dill that I have grown so patiently. Although the event 
obeys all the relevant criteria one would be hard-pressed to call this an environmental problem. Intuitively, a 
fallen football may be a nuisance, it certainly isn't an environmental problem. Calling it one meets with at least 
two objections.
First, if  the straying ball is a problem at all, it is so on account of  my private beliefs about proper child 
behavior. I may think, for instance, that as a moral rule, children should not pester their neighbors. The event is 
unacceptable for me because of  particular norms I happen to have. These norms need not be shared by others 
and most probably aren't. Other people will no doubt believe that children should be allowed to play and an 
occasional ball ending up into someone's yard is no big deal. What this seems to show is that exclusively 
personal norms - norms that are not shared by others - cannot justify the `unacceptable' in the delineation of  
environmental problems. Would shared norms do? As it happens, however, the juxtaposition of  personal and 
shared does not get us to the heart of  the matter either. To show why this is so, I'll slightly change the example.
Suppose this time my neighbor, the kids' father, decides to cut down a row of  trees that fences off  his yard 
from mine. Again we are dealing with a human-induced change of  the physical environment. I find it an 
unacceptable change - for esthetic reasons, I happen to like the trees - but my neighbor obviously doesn't. He 
wants to replace the trees with a plastic fence which needs no care and thus is much more convenient. The 
matter of  norms being privately owned or commonly shared is not exactly at issue here. For the sake of  
argument we could assume that over issues like this the population is split in half  exactly. At issue is the 
difference between the norms to which I and my neighbor seek recourse to justify our opinions. I happen to 
think that trees are beautiful or that they should be saved whenever and wherever possible, that plastic is ugly 
or that one should use as little of  it as possible. He does not care about trees at all (Getting rid of  all those 
leaves in the fall, what a chore!), is oblivious to their beauty, and downplays the effects of  extensive plastic use 
(What difference does one fence make anyway). In order to decide whether we are dealing with an 
environmental problem, however, we have to make up our minds about who is right and who is wrong here. 
For that, we need to evaluate the norms in which my neighbor and I ground our respective decisions. Mine are 
esthetic values, his is a particular kind of  opportunism. Obviously, though, what constitutes an environmental 
problem has a lot to do with the kind of  norms one uses to justify what is and what is not to count as an 
acceptable infringement of  the environment, not so much with their degree of  public support. This lands us 
squarely into a discussion on environmental ethics, which I will not get into as it would take me too far afield.
[7] But this much can be said: If  something constitutes an environmental problem it always is the problem of  
some individual or group of  individuals. And, when discussing the ozone problem, one is only justified to use 
this parlance because the ozone problem is a problem with respect to norms shared by almost everybody.
Summarizing the discussion, I arrive at the following definition:
An environmental problem is a change of  state of  the physical environment which
i) is brought about by human interference with the physical environment, and
ii) has effects which are unacceptable with respect to a particular set of  privately owned or commonly shared 
norms.
Taking stock, although the definition reveals that environmental science has a restricted range of  problems it 
addresses, and thus perhaps may be said to have a restricted domain, a single focal problem seems to be lacking.
Explanatory goals
In the previous section, I characterized environmental science as a problem solving field. Generally speaking, 
this is not a highly controversial position to defend. Many philosophers have explicitly declared that one should 
view science as a problem solving enterprise. Karl Popper and Larry Laudan perhaps have been most 
outspoken in this respect. Laudan even has made an extensive analysis of  the ramifications of  such a position, 
something I will turn to shortly. Furthermore, many of  those who do not explicitly subscribe to a problem 
solving stance implicitly endorse it. Darden and Maull are examples of  this breed.
How are environmental problems to be looked upon, philosophically? The classification that Larry Laudan has 
introduced may help us here.[8] He distinguishes between empirical problems and conceptual problems. 
Empirical problems are first order problems, `oddities about the natural world in need of  explanation'; they are 
substantive questions about the objects which constitute the domain of  a given science. Conceptual problems, 
however, are second order problems, which means that they arise only with respect to a theory. Laudan 
discerns two kinds, internal and external conceptual problems. The internal kind is about a theory's 
methodological status: is it coherent, are its basic categories of  analysis sufficiently specific, etc.? External 
conceptual problems arise out of  a conflict between the theory exhibiting the problem and some other belief  
about the world, be it a scientific theory or doctrine of  a broader scope. Do environmental problems belong to 
any of  these categories?
Ample reflection reveals that environmental problems belong to neither. They are not conceptual problems, as, 
quite clearly, they are about the empirical world. What else could `a change of  state of  the physical 
environment' as mentioned in the definition be taken to mean? In spite of  this empirical character 
environmental problems are not empirical problems sensu Laudan either. They are not oddities requiring 
explanation, if  anything, they are oddities requiring remedy. They are not substantive questions about the objects 
in the domain of  environmental science, if  anything, they are practical questions posed by society to science, 
questions external to science, that is. It thus seems that environmental problems belong to an altogether 
different category, one that, for want of  a better term, one might denote as practical problems. I will not pursue 
the question of  how this kind of  problems could be related to Laudan's classificatory scheme. I shall rest 
content by noting that practical problems seem to have the following characteristics: i) they are external to 
science in that they originate in society ate large, not necessarily in the narrow confines of  academia, ii) they are 
considered solved when their occurrence can be controlled rather than their origins understood. The upshot of 
these considerations is that Laudan's analysis isn't very helpful, at least at this stage of  inquiry.[9] More 
important for our present purposes, it also implies that the solution of  an environmental problem takes a form 
different than foreseen in Maull and Darden's general scheme.
According to Maull and Darden a problem will be solved by explaining it, and there are particular explanatory 
goals that constrain the set of  appropriate explanations. In the case of  practical problems remedies rather than 
explanations are what one is after, and a problem is dealt with satisfactorily if  its occurrence is prevented or its 
effects mitigated. So environmental science also falls short of  being a true field in this respect. However, in a 
weak sense, the criterion is fulfilled. As much as Darden and Maull want to constrain proper solutions for 
(empirical) problems, solutions for practical problems are also constrained by expectations. These expectations 
are particular norms that allow one to distinguish better from worse solutions. And these norms, of  course, 
directly derive from the norms that allow one to recognize a practical problem in the first place (cf. the 
definition of  environmental problems).[10] For example, the depletion of  the ozone layer is an environmental 
problem because, among other things, it poses health risks. Solutions to the ozone problem can then be ranked 
according to the extent to which they diminish the health risk.
What about the other criteria? In order to investigate their fate we need to take a more detailed look at the 
practice of  environmental problem solving. Let us do so by further examining the ozone example.
Intermezzo: Acting upon environmental problems
Ideally, solving environmental problems can be portrayed as a three-staged process.[11] One may distinguish 
the phases of  the problem's description, causal analysis, and solution analysis or scenario building. In the description 
phase a problem is recognized to be an environmental problem and described in a terminology that makes it fit 
for further analysis. Since a problem is by definition a change in the natural environment, the domain of  the 
natural sciences, they advance the appropriate descriptive terminology. The problem's causal analysis, phase 
two, consists of  mapping out the causal network that connects the initial human interference with its 
problematic effects. Somewhere in this web, a node representing the environmental problem under scrutiny is 
located. Once we have this map we may enter the third phase. In this phase various scenarios are analyzed. In 
these scenarios interventions that may lead to the problem's disappearance or at least abatement, feature large. 
The interventions again are human interferences, but this time of  a kind different than the ones that gave rise 
to the problem in the first place.
I will now take a more detailed look at all phases, particularly phases two and three as they reveal most about 
the character of  present-day environmental science.
Phase 1: descriptions and their adequacy
Suppose we are faced with a particular environmental problem, say, the depletion of  the stratospheric ozone 
layer. This is a genuine environmental problem, at least to the extent that we can ignore or discount the effects 
of  natural causes such as the effects of  Mount Pinatubo's eruption mentioned earlier. I will not discuss 
precisely how this could be done. Clearly, this differs on a case by case basis. The general rule is that it is 
sensible to keep in mind that an analysis of  the causal background of  some purported environmental problem 
might reveal that the humanly induced effects are negligible (or even non-existent) as compared to the effects 
from natural causes. In such cases, we have to revise our original opinion as there is no environmental problem 
to speak off. Of  course, action might be needed to cater for its ill-effects. But then the rubric under which this 
action is to be carried out should change. We are not in the business of  solving an environmental problem, 
rather, we are trying to alleviate human suffering by offering humanitarian help. But suppose, as is generally 
agreed, that the ozone problem is a genuine environmental problem.
Phase 2: analyzing the problem's causal network
There is general agreement that the release in the atmosphere of  CFCs is by far the main culprit of  the 
thinning of  the ozone layer. CFCs are widely used, for instance as propellant in aerosol cans, as blowing agent 
for the creation of  foams (such as Styrofoam), as coolant in air conditioners and refrigerators, and also as 
cleansing agent for electronic circuitry. They are cheap and chemically almost inert, two factors that explain 
their wide use. However, in the upper stratosphere the story changes. Up there lies a thin layer of  ozone, a 
highly reactive form of  oxygen. It is formed through the action of  solar radiation upon ordinary oxygen 
molecules. In the troposphere, the lowest stratum of  the atmosphere, where ozone is also formed, it reacts 
instantly with other molecules and hence disappears quickly. In the stratosphere, however, there aren't many 
molecules to react with, which has resulted in the built-up of  a thin layer of  ozone. The importance of  this 
layer for life on earth is that it absorbs almost all harmful solar radiation, so called UV-B radiation, from 
reaching the earth.
The CFCs introduced by us in the lower atmosphere have slowly leaked into the upper stratosphere because of  
their long life time (due to their chemical inertness). There they have affected the ozone layer's protective 
potential dramatically. In spite of  their unwillingness to engage in chemical reactions, solar radiation is able to 
split off  a chlorine-radical (a highly reactive form of  chlorine) of  the CFCs. This radical reacts with ozone and 
changes it back into ordinary oxygen, which is a much less effective absorbent of  UV-B radiation. To make 
things worse, the chlorine-radical acts as a catalyst, that is, after having reacted with an ozone molecule it 
becomes freshly available to engage in a reaction with another ozone molecule. The net effect of  all this is that 
the thickness of  the ozone layer (concentration of  ozone molecules) will be reduced for years to come, not in 
the least because it takes about 15 years for CFCs released into the atmosphere to reach the upper stratosphere.
[12]
So we now have established a connection between a human interference - release of  CFCs in the atmosphere - 
and an environmental problem - increased intensity of  UV-B radiation. If  needed, the entire story could be 
phrased in more exact terms. A numerical relation could be established between, for example, the amount of  
CFC released per annum for some year, the average ozone concentration some number of  years later, and the 
average intensity of  the UV-B radiation reaching the earth. Such a rephrasing ideally takes the form of  a 
mathematical model which, preferably, contains the purported mechanism behind the increase in UV-B 
radiation and allows us to extrapolate from known values of  variables to unknown ones. Slightly getting ahead 
of  my story, in this particular case there is no doubt that one would be highly interested in the effects of  a 
lowered CFC release on atmospheric UV-B radiation levels.
More generally and abstracting away from the example at hand, one could say that the object of  the analysis 
phase has been the construction of  a model, preferably a mathematical one, that describes the causal network 
connecting interference with problem. Ideally this description is not a pure description but contains enough 
insight into the mechanisms connecting interference and effect to allow us to speak of  an explanatory model.
[13]
Phase 3: scenario building
In the case of  the ozone layer problem, the world community has acted amazingly promptly to the threat of  
increased intensities of  UV-B radiation. In 1987, at a conference in Montreal a protocol was signed with the 
intent of  taking measures to protect the ozone layer. The protocol demanded levels of  the major CFCs to be 
kept at 1986 levels until 1993. After 1993 a gradual reduction was to take place. However, it soon turned out 
that the levels of  CFC-emission admissible according to the Montreal protocol would not sufficiently protect 
the ozone layer. In fact, calculations showed that chlorine concentrations would keep rising as a consequence of 
which the ozone layer would probably end up being depleted entirely. Under the guidance of  UNEP, the 
United Nations Environmental Program, within a year after the Montreal Protocol a new, more stringent 
agreement was signed in London. Under this agreement, chlorine levels should start falling around the year 
2000.
Little reflection reveals that the story just told has all the marks of  a decision making process. And indeed 
decision processes are the warp and woof  of  the third phase, the scenario building phase. In environmental 
decision processes, as in any decision process, four elements play a part. First, there are obviously the actions 
one may undertake. Actions are human interferences that are meant to solve a given problem. In the context of 
the CFC case, they are the various measures to which the signatories to the Montreal and London agreement 
have committed themselves. Second, actions are taken with the aim of  producing a particular result or outcome, 
the solution to the environmental problem. In the example, outcomes are the degree to which the destruction 
of  the ozone layer is cut back.
Third, what the outcome will be not only depends on the action but also on the system acted upon. This is 
where the analysis of  the causal network and the model that resulted from it pay off. The model captures, or so 
it should, the important characteristics of  the system under consideration, such as the rate at which CFCs 
migrate from the troposphere to the upper stratosphere, the chemical reactions that take place, the rates at 
which they progress. The model allows one to trace (compute) the consequences of  actions. As models are 
always models of some natural system, they harbor uncertainties. A model may be structurally wrong - a risk to be 
minimized by working with various models in a decision process. A model may rest on little or biased data - 
something to be countered by including measures of  the reliability of  the data into a model's predictions.[14] In 
spite of  all precautions, science is fallible and so its predictions may fail to come true.
Finally, in order to be able to choose among the actions considered, outcomes are valued with respect to their 
utility. The utility of  an action should reflect the extent to which the problem at hand is solved. In the final 
analysis, an outcome's utility determines whether the corresponding action is chosen or not. In the ozone case, 
a solution that reduces CFC-emission considerably has a higher utility than one that doesn't, etc. As the 
London protocol does just this it has a higher utility than the Montreal protocol.
Methods, theories and a special vocabulary
The description given above of  how environmental science goes about solving its problems discloses a 
characteristic of  the field, even though it isn't a characteristic unique to environmental science: it deploys 
models in a decision theoretical context. It seems, this method suits the goal of  practical problem solving 
particularly well. Indeed, here we may have a method that is characteristic of  the field at large. But since it does 
not characterize the field uniquely, it is a rather weak reason for calling environmental science a true field.
The above description reveals something more. As we saw, the analysis of  the ozone problem took inputs from 
environmental chemistry, in particular atmospheric chemistry and photochemistry. Also, although we didn't 
explicitly discuss this, the knowledge contributed by meteorologists about radiation intensities, temperatures 
and transportation mechanisms at various altitudes is required for a proper analysis of  the ozone problem.
What prompts us to act upon the depletion of  the ozone layer are the effects of  the increased intensity of  UV-
B radiation. The incidence of  skin cancer, for example, is expected to rise. Other effects on the human body 
such as cataracts in the eye's lens, retinal damage and suppression of  the immune system may also result. Other 
organisms, both animals and plants, both higher and lower, will be similarly affected through mutations or 
damage to their physiological systems. If  crop plants are affected - and they probably would - effects on yields 
are to be expected. If  plankton is affected - and because of  the small size of  the organisms involved serious 
damage is likely - marine food chains may change as these organisms are at the bottom of  such chains. This in 
turn may have consequences for entire marine ecosystems, including amounts of  fish harvested from the seas. 
Finally, climatic changes may also result, as the thinner ozone layer lets more solar radiation pass through, 
heating up the lower parts of  the atmosphere. Whatever the climatological effects exactly will be remains to be 
seen but they might well include effects on crop yields, which in turn may cause people to move, etc. (There are 
obvious parallels with the green house effect.) So the consequences of  the emission of  CFCs may range far 
and wide and their understanding may concern a number of  theories from various scientific disciplines, ranging 
from medicine, via physiology, ecology, agronomy, and fishery biology to climatology.
The number of  disciplines involved becomes even larger when we also take into account the analysis of  
scenarios that could lead to the problem's solution. A non-systematic survey lists the following specialists. 
Chemists, particularly of  a technological bend, might devise alternative molecules that mimic the CFCs in their 
functions without having their drawbacks. And indeed, CFCs have been replaced with different propellants, 
non-CFC fire retardents have been developed, foams are being blown in different ways, etc. Another 
technological solution would be to change the process under consideration such that there is no need for a 
CFC or a replacement. To some extent the electronics industry which uses CFCs as a cleansing agent has been 
successful in reducing the need for such agents; in some cases styrene foam trays have been replaced by carton 
ones; refrigerators are under development that operate on an entirely different principle, using ultrasound 
rather than refrigerants and a compressor. Yet another possibility would be to reduce the societal want for 
particular a product. Do we really need aerosol cans? If  not, we don't need the propellants that go in them 
either. Also, do we really need air conditioners in so many cars? If  not, we would save on refrigerants. 
Examining such questions would be a matter for politicians and social scientist of  various persuasions. 
Economic analyses, for example, will have to accompany almost any proposed solution. Finally, if  a 
government wants to impose particular measures legal action is necessary, which requires inputs from lawyers.
The above survey shows that, although the description of  an environmental problem may be considered the 
privilege of  the natural sciences, the knowledge used in the analysis of  the causes of  and solutions for 
environmental problems is derived from a much wider variety of  disciplines ranging from the social sciences to 
the natural sciences. However usually, the models used are not so comprehensive as to span the entire breadth 
of  disciplines mentioned. They are rather limited as is evidenced by the following description of  a 
photochemical model:
We are now in a position to see how kinetic models of  atmospheric reactions can be formulated. In principle, 
all that is required is the writing of  a [reaction] equation ... for each component, i, of  the atmosphere, taking 
into account transport processes, and recognizing that in such equations the production rates and loss rates 
will, in general, be complex functions involving photochemical rate coefficient and rate constants multiplied by 
concentrations.[15]
Basically, this model restricts itself  to chemical reaction equations and the only transgression into another 
discipline might be the incorporation of  transport processes, belonging to the realm of  the physics of  the 
atmosphere.
In order to calculate the increased skin cancer risk as a function of  UV-B exposure, other models, particularly 
epidemiological models, would be required. Such models exist and allow the calculation of  risks incurred at 
projected ozone levels. Similarly, ecological models would be needed to estimate ecosystem damage and crop 
reduction as a consequence of  lowered ozone concentrations. At present, such models are only available in 
rudimentary form.
The above survey shows that, first, a number of  theories from disparate fields are involved in formulating 
solutions for the ozone problem. Although I haven't analyzed other examples, this conclusion appears to apply 
generally. Second in order to solve the problem techniques and methods are employed from various disciplines. 
Both chemical analysis techniques and epidemiological census techniques are required. This too, I would 
submit, applies quite generally. Third, also at the level of  the theories employed one draws from multiple 
(sub)fields. The photochemist calculates the ozone concentration as a function of  past and current emission 
levels; the epidemiologist computes the risks one runs at particular ozone concentrations; the ecologist and 
agronomist try to evaluate ecosystem consequences in terms of  diversity changes and crop size reductions as a 
function of  the same ozone concentrations. What in the case at hand binds the various (sub)fields together is 
the existence of  the ozone problem. This applies quite generally, I would submit: it is the problem at hand that 
dictates what combination of  subdisciplines will be involved. All in all, traditional environmental science 
appears to draw heavily upon existing scientific disciplines and there is no method nor theory unique to 
environmental science.
There is a fourth feature of  environmental science that deserves our attention. As I mentioned, according to 
Maull and Darden, individual fields can each be characterized by their so-called special vocabulary. In the ozone 
case we saw that the models used are largely monodisciplinary. This means that special vocabularies are kept 
apart. This, I hold, also is a general feature of  traditional environmental science. It may happen that, in 
discussing solution scenarios, vocabularies are mixed. However, mixing is all that happens, the vocabularies do 
not interact with each other so that, for instance meaning shifts occur. Chemists still talk chemistry, ecologists 
ecology, etc.
Wrapping up our discussion so far, then, environmental science as practiced traditionally is a genuine 
multidisciplinary field. It may indeed possess a set of  similar problems, a truly focal problem is missing though. 
Second, although practical goals can be discerned, explanatory goals are conspicuously lacking. Third, the 
special vocabularies, methods, techniques and theories used all prove to belong to sub-fields of  environmental 
science rather than to a unified field called environmental science. So the picture that emerges is that of  quite a 
heterogeneous field, one consisting of  multiple subfields each with its own methods, techniques and theories. 
As I will now argue, the introduction of  the notion of  sustainability has changed all this.
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AS AN 
INTERDISCIPLINE
To be precise, I will argue that the notion of  sustainability has introduced into environmental science both a 
focal problem and an associated special vocabulary; that, besides practical goals there now are explanatory goals 
too; that methods and techniques have evolved not belonging to specific subfields; and, finally, that there are 
even indications for the evolution of  specific theoretical insights. All this is evidence for the emergence of  an 
interdiscipline or interfield of  environmental science. I will now discuss each piece of  evidence in some detail.
Specific vocabulary
Just now, I posited that the special vocabulary of  environmental science is a mere mixture of  the special 
vocabularies of  a number of  disciplines referred to as environmental sub-disciplines. To a large extent the 
current situation is no different. However, there are good reasons to regard sustainability as a new notion, 
unique to a new interdisciplinary field (interfield) called environmental science.
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development published a report called Our Common 
Future[16]. It is the written result of  a two year study after issues of  environment and development conducted 
by a prestigious group of  people led by Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The report, 
commonly known as the Brundtland report, marks a milestone in our thinking in environment and 
development.[17] It showed the intricate links between environmental concerns and development, particularly 
on non-industrialized countries. More important for our present purposes, it defined and popularized the 
notion of  sustainability. According to the report,
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of  the present without compromising the ability 
of  future generations to meet their own needs.[18]
Note that this definition has a clear-cut normative import, it forbids development that would compromise the 
needs of  future generations.
Focal problems
This new notion not only can be regarded as part of  an incipient special vocabulary, it also provides the newly 
emerging interfield with a focal problem. In line with the practical nature of  environmental science discussed 
above, the central question would be `How does one achieve sustainability?' The economist Herman Daly has 
addressed this question and, in an attempt to answer it, operationalized the notion of  sustainability.[19] Using 
the reformulation that Meadows et al. have given of  Daly's ideas:
* For a renewable resource -- soil, water, forest, fish -- the sustainable rate of  use can be no greater than the rate of 
regeneration. ...
* For a non-renewable resource -- fossil fuel, high grade mineral ore, fossil ground water -- the sustainable rate of  
use can be no greater than the rate at which a renewable resource, used sustainably, can be substituted for it ...
* For a pollutant the sustainable rate of  emission can be no greater than the rate at which that pollutant can be 
recycled, absorbed, or rendered harmless by the environment. ...[20]
This operationalization is illuminating for a number of  reasons. First, it leads to an enlargement of  the 
interfield's special vocabulary: renewable resource and non-renewable resource are cases in point; Daly's term 
`quasi-sustainable' which he uses to characterize sustainable use of  non-renewables, which, of  course, strictly 
speaking is impossible, falls under the same rubric.[21] Second, the operationalization points to a new method 
for achieving sustainability, unique to the interfield.
Methods and techniques
There even is a candidate for a field specific method. Although the method is mentioned by Daly nor 
Meadows, their followers have developed it and now it belongs to the standard tool kit of  the environmental 
scientist.[22] I am referring to Life Cycle Analysis. Put briefly, Life Cycle Analysis seeks to track down the entire 
life cycle of  a product, from the mining of  its constituents through its manufacturing to its ultimate discarding; 
it seeks to look at this life cycle from the point of  view of  sustainability. To what extent can waste be recycled, 
what pollutants result, is energy used sustainably, etc. are questions addressed. Quite obviously this method 
thanks its very existence to the introduction of  the notion of  sustainability. In this sense it supports the 
contention that an interfield called environmental science exists.
A third piece of  evidence also regards methods. Environmental problems are still solved using the three-staged 
process described earlier. As sustainability has permeated the specific vocabulary of  environmental science, one 
may expect that it has affected both a problem's description and its causal analysis in terms of  a model. And 
indeed, in the Dutch National Environmental Outlook 2 these phenomena can be witnessed to occur, for 
instance with respect to the ozone case discussed earlier. A telling phrase is: `Given the complexity and great 
uncertainties it is not possible to draw up a strict standard for sustainability', implying that the entire modeling 
effort is centered around the issue of  sustainability.[23] And indeed, one goes on by saying that
An effects-based approach could be to reduce the concentration of  chlorine and bromine in the atmosphere to 
1.5 to 2 ppbv chlorine equivalent ... The reasoning behind this is that if  this level, measured in 1975 just before 
the hole in the ozone layer was discovered, is exceeded it is likely that the ozone layer above the Antarctic will 
not recover.[24]
This quote points also to another aspect. Recall that in environmental decision making, the utility of  outcomes 
had to be judged so as to make a decision possible. As the quotation reveals, in the ozone case the utility 
ordering really is a sustainability ordering, that is, to what extent an outcome is to be preferred to another 
depends on its contribution to a sustainable solution. Emission levels above 2 ppbv have lower utility than 
levels below it.
Theories
As a final piece of  evidence, consider the following quote from Daly's paper:
The Brundtland Commission Report ... has made a great contribution by emphasizing the importance of  
sustainable development and in effect forcing it to the top of  the agenda of  the United Nations and the 
multilateral development banks. To achieve this remarkable consensus, the Commission had to be less than 
rigorous in avoiding self-contradiction. One hoped that the glaring contradiction of  a world economy growing by a 
factor 5 or10 and at the same time respecting ecological limits, which was present but subdued in the Report, 
would be resolved in future discussion. In fact, however, Mrs. Brundtland has subsequently urged economic 
growth by a factor 5 or 10 as a necessary part of  sustainable development.[25]
What the quote makes clear is that there is a conflict about what exactly sustainable development means. One 
may construe this conflict in one of  two ways, as a conflict about methodological norms (self-contradiction) or 
as a conflict about economic and ecological possibilities. Either way, we are dealing with a conceptual problem 
sensu Laudan, be it internal or external. The interesting point is that sustainability comes out of  this as a 
theoretical notion; after all, conceptual problems are exhibited by theories only. From this one may conclude, 
admittedly somewhat prematurely, that we are witnessing the evolution of  a theory of  sustainable development, 
a theory belonging to the new interfield of  environmental science.
In summary, from the evidence adduced one may conclude at this stage that the multidisciplinary field of  
environmental science is on its way of  becoming a true interdiscipline or interfield, even though there still is a 
long way to go.
CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this paper I raised an issue: why bother at all about the question of  whether 
environmental science is an interdiscipline or a mere multidiscipline. I then referred to particular benefits that 
come with interdisciplinary status such as better access to funds, etc. At this junction, I can be a bit more 
specific about the issue of  benefits. There is one benefit that remained unmentioned. It has to do with the 
efficiency with which environmental problems may be solved.[26]
Quite in general and omitting all details, one might say that traditional, multidisciplinary environmental problem 
solving is less efficient than interdisciplinary environmental problem solving. Traditionally, a problem is 
partitioned, split up in non-overlapping sub-problems that, ideally, jointly cover the entire breadth of  the 
original problem. The splitting up is done in such a fashion that established disciplines such as chemistry, 
biology, economics - usually in the guise of  their applied cousins environmental chemistry, environmental 
biology, and environmental economy - can have a go at the problem. This, at least, is what the ozone case very 
much suggested. The approach seems to be a perfectly valid and valuable one in that at least it guarantees input 
from various disciplines thus enriching and strengthening the analysis carried out. Also, at times it may be the 
best one can hope for. However, it also suffers from short-comings.
To continue the use of  the mathematical metaphor, the partitioning might well be less than perfect. Because 
sub-problems do not fit the existing disciplinary subdivision they may be left out thus making the analysis 
incomplete. Alternatively, the same sub-problem may be analyzed from two different disciplinary angles - 
ecological damage assessed by ecologists and agronomists would be a case in point - at best making the analysis 
redundant, at worst incoherent. What is needed to prevent this from happening is a kind of  bird's eye view, 
some way of  overseeing the problem in its entire complexity, with all its ramifications.
Traditionally, this was achieved through what somewhat cynically might be called `problem management': a 
group of  people tries to solve a problem by partitioning the relevant questions optimally. More often than not, 
these groups are existing bodies, part of  a full-fledged social structure, they may government departments, 
research institutes, NGOs, or political pressure groups. In their turn these groups invoke the help of  other such 
groups and so on. The complicated web that thus is spun has its own social dynamics which, in terms of  the 
efficiency of  problem management, leaves to be desired for. To mention but one example, the negotiating table 
seems hardly the best place to sort out the answers to scientific problems. And, indeed, the history of  the US 
attitude towards the question of  global warming, the British attitude towards the question of  maintaining 
biodiversity, or the Dutch government's policy with respect to the animal manure surplus betray political 
wheeling and dealing, revealing that forces other than a wish to arrive at environmentally sound solutions are 
operative. The upshot of  all this is that the success of  a multidisciplinary approach for the greater part depends 
on the organization of  the group of  researchers involved and its dynamics; only to a lesser extent the `quality' 
of  the knowledge, of  the theories and models involved matters.[27]
In an interdisciplinary setting much of  this may perhaps be avoided. Problems that are overlooked because of  a 
non-optimal splitting of  the original problem may be avoided now that a focal problem is available. Group 
dynamics are internalized and hence easier to control. What used to be an ad hoc network of  people now has 
become an internal network.
These speculations may sound overly optimistic and perhaps they are. However, quite irrespective of  their fate, 
environmental science does seem to be heading into the direction of  interdisciplinarity. Time will tell us what 
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Footnotes
[1] Cf. Zandvoort (1986) and Udo de Haes (1991) who explicitly discuss the issue. I am not aware of  any 
similar discussions outside of  the Dutch context, but I would be highly surprised were they to be confined to 
the Netherlands only.
[2] cf. Maull, 1977; Darden and Maull, 1977; Darden, 1991. Similar ideas have been voiced by many others and 
various accounts exist of  how interdisciplinarity comes about. See for instance Mitchell et al. for an analysis of  
how the biological and social sciences might fruitfully co-operate.
[3] Darden and Maull, 1977.
[4] Darden, 1991, p.19.
[5] See Vincent Kiernan, (1993) p.8. See also G. Pitari and V. Rizi, Geophysical Research Letters, 18 (1991), 833 
who predicted a reduction as a consequence of  Mount Pinatubo's eruption.
[6] This will be discussed in more detail later on.
[7] See the contributions by Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Michael Ruse and Gunnar Skirbekk in the volume this 
paper is published in.
[8] Laudan, 1977
[9] I should mention that at least one group of  philosophers has been explicitly concerned about these matters. 
Usually they are referred to as the Starnbergers (Böhme et al., 1978). In the seventies, they have performed a 
number of  studies which all attempted to show how it was that particular scientific theories were applied, that 
is, used to solve practical problems. Their analysis, however, is hardly useful as their focus of  attention is 
theories which also have to be mature. In my view this is too narrow an approach to be useful here. See also 
Zandvoort, op. cit. and Boersema, 1991.
[10] My claims are made with respect to practical problems in general. However, my analysis pertains to 
environmental problems only. Although I do not adduce evidence in support of  the more general claim, I do 
believe that, first, all practical problems ultimately rest on norms, second, all solutions to practical problems can 
be ordered on an ordinal scale on the basis of  the same norms.
[11] See, for instance, Udo de Haes, 1991.
[12] This story is described in many papers and books. A good source for a technical treatment is to be found 
in Phillips (1988) and Sherwood Rowland (1988), and RIVM (1992). A more accessible but nonetheless 
comprehensive treatment can be found in chapter 5 of  Meadows et al., 1993.
[13] Mechanisms, admittedly, is a somewhat vague notion, but the idea I want to get across here is that the 
model contains genuine insights into the system's internal functioning and not merely establishes the strength 
of  statistical correlations between variables. Although purely statistical and descriptive models allow 
extrapolation to values not observed this is a risky business. The assumption is made, but not independently 
checked, that a system under observation does not changes its behavior in any structural sense. The occurrence 
of  threshold-like phenomena, for instance, would be disastrous. Explanatory models containing behavior 
mechanism are not sensitive to this kind phenomena, that is, in so far as the mechanism takes thresholds into 
account. Of  course, a model cannot foresee what it wasn't designed to foresee.
[14] See for an introductory treatment of  the role of  models Doucet and Sloep (1992), particularly chapters 13 
and 14.
[15] Phillips, 1988, p. 136
[17] Meadows et al. literally say: `the two primary contributions of  this [the Brundtland] study were the 
definition and popularization of  the idea of  sustainability and the strong linkage of  the issues of  environment 
and development.' (Meadows, 1992, p.273)
[18] United Nations World Commission of  Environment, 1987.
[19] Daly, 1990.
[20] Meadows et al. 1992, p.46.
[21] Daly, 1990, p.4
[22] Cf. RIVM, 1992 passim and Meester, 1992.
[23] RIVM, 1992, p.131.
[24] ibid.
[25] Daly, 1990, pp. 1 - 2.; emphasis added
[26] That this is an issue of  some importance is evidenced by a letter sent to the New Scientist in 1991. The 
letter was sent by Newby, a social scientist. He argued that cooperation between scientists of  various 
persuasions is an absolute necessity. At the same time complained about the sluggishness with which such 
cooperation is established.
[27] Cf. Glasbergen (1993) for evidence and a rather cynical view. He wonders whether environmental conflicts 
could perhaps better be fought out in the political arena alone. There, he argues, the entire decision process is 
taking place anyway, without much of  an eye for scientific arguments. So why not skip the science entirely and 
immeditely?
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